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Executive Summary 
 
The Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) is managed jointly by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Select Agents and Toxins 
(DSAT) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), Agriculture Select Agent Services (AgSAS). FSAP oversees the possession, use and transfer of 
biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) so that research can be conducted as safely and securely as 
possible. This research provides important scientific discoveries that have led to improved detection, 
prevention, diagnostic, and treatment options for diseases considered to be some of the most threatening 
to public health.  
 
The United States Government (USG) recently released two sets of recommendations related to the safety 
and security of work with BSAT, one from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) and 
another from the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations (FTAC-SAR). The 
implementation of these recommendations is underway and represents progress toward strengthening the 
government’s biosafety and biosecurity practices and the oversight system. The recommendations 
recognize that work with BSAT has human, animal, and plant health and national security benefits. The 
recommendations of both groups are complementary and will help further ensure that life science efforts, 
which benefit the global community in countering biological threats, are carried out safely and securely. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also released its own recommendations for oversight 
program improvement through a 90-day Internal Review of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins. All 
three reviews recommended that FSAP increase transparency and public engagement, as well as improve 
communication between it and the regulated community. To further public understanding of FSAP, this 
report marks the program’s first annual effort towards communicating operational metrics to the American 
public. Over time, the program expects to gain more experience with reporting these data, improve the 
reporting process, and be able to share more details on other aspects of the program. FSAP will publish a 
similar report on an annual basis going forward. 
 
The following report summarizes calendar year 2015 data for FSAP. The three reviews discussed above 
were published in October 2015, and not all recommended improvements are reflected in this summary. 
 
Registered Entities 
 
As of December 31, FSAP regulated 291 entities, with 40 entities registered with AgSAS as the lead 
agency and 251 entities registered with DSAT as the lead agency. When an entity is registered for both 
HHS-only and USDA-only agents, their registration is managed jointly under a lead agency. Fifty-one 
entities were jointly overseen by AgSAS and DSAT with AgSAS serving as the lead agency for 15 entities 
and DSAT serving as the lead agency for 36 entities. Registration with FSAP requires an entity to renew 
their registration every three years. 
 
Regulated entities include:  
• 32% academic.  
• 18% commercial.  
• 15% federal government.  
• 29% non-federal government.  
• 6% private.  
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In 2015, FSAP renewed the registration of 106 entities (12 AgSAS and 94 DSAT). Two entities applied to 
AgSAS for new registrations (both registrations were approved), and 27 entities withdrew from the program. 
 
Security Risk Assessments  
 
A security risk assessment (SRA) is an electronic records check performed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to determine whether a person requesting to have access to select agents and toxins is 
a “restricted person” or otherwise may be prohibited from having such access. The FBI conducted 4,442 
SRAs in 2015, with 4,426 individuals being approved and 16 individuals identified as meeting the definition 
of a “restricted person.”1 
 
Inspections 
 
FSAP conducted 216 inspections in 2015. FSAP conducts inspections of registered entities for many 
reasons: registration renewals, lack of compliance with the select agent regulations, verification of 
corrective actions, addition of new space, investigation of incidents, and new registration applications. Of 
the 216 inspections, 33 were conducted by AgSAS, 145 were conducted by DSAT, and 38 inspections 
were conducted jointly by AgSAS and DSAT. Inspection length ranged from one to eight days on site with 
an average length of three days.  
 
Inspection Findings and Compliance 
 
FSAP works closely with all regulated entities to assist them with complying with the select agent 
regulations (SAR)2. Inspection findings range from minor documentation errors in plans to serious biosafety 
or security issues, such as failure to use personal protective equipment (PPE) appropriately or working with 
a select agent outside of approved registered laboratory spaces.  
When an inspector finds a significant biosafety and/or security concern during an entity inspection, FSAP 
works with the entity to bring them into compliance with SAR. In some cases, an entity is offered the 
opportunity to participate in the FSAP Corrective Action Plan (CAP) program, in which the entity develops 
and implements a plan of corrective actions closely monitored by FSAP. If an entity chooses not to go on a 
CAP, they are expected to successfully resolve the corrective action requirements within 30 days. If 
necessary, FSAP can suspend an entity’s registration when a departure from SAR is found to represent an 
imminent danger to human, animal, or plant health, or public safety. An entity may also be referred to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) or APHIS Investigative 
and Enforcement Services (IES) for further investigation and possible civil penalties. FSAP may also refer a 
matter to the FBI for investigation.  
In 2015: 
• Six entities agreed to participate in the CAP program.  
• Three entities had their registration suspended.  
• Four entities were referred to either the HHS OIG or USDA IES including two of the entities that 
had their registration suspended (the third suspended entity was referred in 2016) and two entities 
associated with the multiple and repeated discovery of BSAT materials in unregistered locations. 
                                                 
 
1 The definition of a “restricted person” may be found in 18 U.S.C. § 175b(d).  
2 The select agent regulations can be found at 7 C.F.R. Part 331, 9 C.F.R. Part 121, and 42 C.F.R. Part 73. 
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• 16 entities were referred to the FBI. 
 
HHS OIG and USDA OIG Hotlines 
FSAP has established a confidential means for reporting safety and security issues associated with the 
possession, use, and transfer of BSAT. The HHS OIG and the USDA OIG maintain a hotline that allows 
individuals or entities to anonymously report safety or security issues related to BSAT or safety issues 
associated with infectious biological agents, infectious substances, and vectors. Each report is investigated 
to determine if a violation of the regulations has occurred. In 2015, three reports to FSAP were received 
through the hotline. 
Restricted Experiments 
 
An individual or entity may not conduct or possess products resulting from restricted experiments involving 
BSAT unless approved by and conducted in accordance with the conditions prescribed by FSAP. SAR 
defines two types of restricted experiments: 
1. The deliberate transfer of, or selection for, drug resistance traits to select agents that are not 
known to acquire the trait naturally, if such acquisition could compromise the control of disease 
agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture.  
2. The deliberate formation of synthetic or recombinant DNA containing genes for the biosynthesis of 
select toxins lethal for vertebrates at an LD50 < 100 ng/kg body weight.  
 
In 2015, DSAT approved three of the four requests it received to conduct a restricted experiment for nucleic 
acids encoding for botulinum neurotoxin. DSAT did not receive any requests involving drug resistance traits 
that met the definition of the first restricted experiment listed above in 2015. AgSAS did not receive any 
requests to conduct restricted experiments. 
 
Exclusions 
 
An entity or individual may request to exclude from SAR an attenuated strain of a select agent or a select 
toxin modified to be less potent or toxic. In 2015, there were eight requests for permission to exclude 
attenuated select agent strains or less potent/toxic forms of select toxins. All eight requests were approved. 
A detailed list of all excluded select agent strains can be found at Select Agents and Toxins Exclusions. 
 
Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin  
 
The Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin (APHIS/CDC Form 4) is used by registered and 
unregistered clinical, diagnostic, or public health laboratories to notify FSAP of BSAT identified as the result 
of diagnosis, verification, and proficiency testing, and of the final disposition of identified BSAT. 
Unregistered laboratories do not deliberately work with BSAT but may occasionally encounter BSAT in the 
course of their diagnostic activity. When this occurs, the laboratory is required to submit a Form 4 and 
either register with FSAP in order to keep the sample, transfer the sample to an entity registered to possess 
that BSAT, or destroy the sample. 
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The top 10 most identified BSAT as reported to DSAT in 2015 were: Francisella tularensis (219 identified), 
Botulinum neurotoxin (202)3, Botulinum producing species of Clostridium (144), Brucella melitensis (89), 
Yersinia pestis (75), Eastern equine encephalitis virus (71), Coxiella burnetii (30), Brucella abortus (29), 
Brucella suis (25), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (22).  
 
Identified BSAT reported to AgSAS in 2015 were: Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (304), Newcastle 
disease virus (26), African swine fever virus (2), and Ralstonia solanacearum (13). 
  
Transfers of Select Agents or Toxins  
 
The APHIS/CDC Form 2 Request to Transfer Select Agents and Toxins is used by entities to request prior 
authorization to transfer BSAT. BSAT may be transferred from one entity to another for many reasons, 
including diagnostic testing, scientific or clinical research, and production of therapeutics. In 2015, DSAT 
approved 337 BSAT transfers. AgSAS approved 126 BSAT transfers. There were two transfer violations in 
2015 involving entities not registered with FSAP. These entities identified BSAT in an unknown diagnostic 
sample but did not properly initiate the BSAT transfer process. In both cases, the samples were received 
unexpectedly by a registered federal government entity which immediately notified FSAP. It was 
determined that there was not any evidence of theft, loss, or release of BSAT. 
 
Theft, Loss, and Release of Select Agents and Toxins  
 
An entity registered with FSAP is required by SAR (7 CFR § 331.19, 9 CFR § 121.19, and 42 CFR § 73.19) 
to notify either AgSAS or DSAT immediately upon discovery of a theft (unauthorized removal of BSAT), 
loss (failure to account for BSAT), or release (occupational exposure or release of BSAT outside of the 
primary barriers of the biocontainment area) of BSAT.  
In 2015, there were 12 potential losses and 233 potential releases reported to FSAP. 
• 12 reports of potential losses of BSAT were investigated by the FBI, and all were determined to be 
records management errors or were samples mistakenly autoclaved as waste.  
o Of the 233 potential releases, 199 reports were determined to represent potential 
occupational exposure to laboratory workers.  
 Of these 199, two were reports of seroconversions involving three laboratory staff 
with no known incident, and were identified by routine annual screening of 
laboratory staff.  
o Two reports were determined to represent potential releases of Xanthomonas oryzae. 
Because this BSAT infects plants and is not a danger to humans, these events were not 
classified as potential occupational exposures but as releases outside primary containment 
(like a biosafety cabinet (BSC)).  
o 32 reports did not meet the regulatory criteria for a release. 
None of the potential releases resulted in illnesses, deaths, or transmissions outside of laboratories into the 
surrounding environment. No thefts of BSAT were reported.  
                                                 
 
3 Infant Botulism cases represent ~80% of botulism cases every year. http://www.cdc.gov/nationalsurveillance/botulism-
surveillance.html 
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Emergency Response 
 
FSAP reaches out to assist entities with transferring or securing BSAT that may be impacted by adverse 
weather events that could affect the safety and security of BSAT. FSAP assistance includes arranging 
transfers and/or destruction of BSAT. There were 13 adverse weather events tracked by FSAP in 2015. 
FSAP successfully contacted a total of 121 affected entities that did not require assistance. There were no 
reported releases of BSAT associated with these weather events. 
 
Federal Register Notices, Policy Statements, and Guidance 
 
There were five issuances of information in 2015: 
• Policy statement regarding when APHIS and CDC Import Permits are not required for the 
importation or interstate transportation of BSAT (February). 
• Updated guidance on the criteria reviewed and considered by FSAP in determining if certain 
experiments meet the definition of a restricted experiment (March).  
• Federal Register/Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the biennial review and 
republication of the list of select agents and toxins (March) 
• Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment for a proposal to add certain influenza viruses to 
the list of HHS BSAT (July). 
• Policy statement regarding inactivated B. anthracis and new requirements necessary to protect 
human and animal health (November).  
 
Outreach 
 
FSAP has an active outreach program designed to provide opportunities for interaction of the program with 
members of the regulated community. Outreach initiatives in 2015 included conducting a national webcast 
and exhibiting an informational booth at scientific conferences to provide guidance and promote compliance 
with SAR.  
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Acronyms 
 
Acronym Meaning 
AgSAS Agriculture Select Agent Services 
Ag-ISATTAC Agricultural-Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory 
Committee 
ASIS American Society for Industrial Security 
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories 
ASM American Society for Microbiology 
BSAT Biological Select Agents and Toxins 
BSC Biosafety Cabinet 
BSL Biosafety Level 
CAP Corrective Action Plan 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services Division  
DSAT Division of Select Agents and Toxins 
FAQ  Frequently Asked Questions 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FESAP Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel 
FSAP Federal Select Agent Program 
FTAC-SAR Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
IES Investigative and Enforcement Services  
ISATTAC Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee 
HHS OIG HHS Office of Inspector General  
RO Responsible Official  
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
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Acronym Meaning 
PPQ Plant Protection and Quarantine 
SAR Select Agents and Toxins Regulations 
SRA Security Risk Assessment 
TLR Theft, Loss or Release 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
USG United States Government 
VS Veterinary Services 
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Introduction 
The Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) is jointly managed by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)/Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) and the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS)/Agriculture Select Agent Services (AgSAS). FSAP oversees the 
possession, use and transfer of biological select agents and toxins (BSAT), 
which have the potential to pose a severe threat to human, animal or plant 
health or to animal or plant products in accordance with HHS and USDA Select 
Agents and Toxins Regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9 CFR 
Part 121) (SAR). FSAP helps to ensure work with BSAT is conducted as safely 
and securely as possible by:  
• Developing, implementing, and enforcing the select agents and toxins 
regulations (SAR). 
• Maintaining a national database to track where and what work is being 
conducted with BSAT. 
• Inspecting entities that possess, use, or transfer BSAT to ensure that 
legitimate use efforts are conducted safely and securely. 
• Ensuring that all individuals who have access to BSAT undergo a security 
risk assessment performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)/Criminal Justice Information Services Division. 
• Developing guidance documents and conducting informational workshops 
and webinars to help regulated entities maintain SAR compliance. 
• Investigating incidents in which human, animal, or plant health is put at risk 
and in which non-compliance with SAR may have occurred. 
 
The United States Government (USG) recently released two sets of 
recommendations, one from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel 
(FESAP) and another from the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent 
Regulations (FTAC-SAR). The implementation of these recommendations is 
underway and represents progress toward strengthening the government’s 
biosafety and biosecurity practices and the oversight system. The 
recommendations recognize that work with BSAT has human, animal, and plant 
health and national security benefits. The recommendations of both groups are 
complementary and will help to further ensure that life science efforts, which 
benefit the global community in countering biological threats, are carried out 
safely and securely. CDC also released its own recommendations for oversight 
program improvement through a 90-day Internal Review of the Division of Select 
Agents and Toxins. 
 
All three reviews recommended that FSAP increase transparency and public 
engagement, as well as improve communication between FSAP and the 
regulated community. This report marks the program’s first annual effort towards 
communicating operational metrics to the American public to further public 
understanding of FSAP. Over time, the program expects to gain more 
 
HHS Only Select Agents 
and Toxins 
Abrin 
Botulinum neurotoxins*  
Botulinum neurotoxin producing 
species of Clostridium*  
Conotoxins  
Coxiella burnetii  
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever 
Diacetoxyscirpenol  
Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus  
Ebola virus*  
Francisella tularensis*  
Lassa fever virus  
Lujo virus  
Marburg virus*  
Monkeypox virus  
Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus  
Ricin  
Rickettsia prowazekii  
SARS-associated coronavirus  
Saxitoxin  
Chapare  
Guanarito  
Junin  
Machupo  
Sabia  
Staphylococcal enterotoxins  
T-2 toxin  
Tetrodotoxin  
Far Eastern subtype  
Siberian subtype  
Kyasanur Forest disease virus  
Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus  
Variola major virus*  
Variola minor virus *  
Yersinia pestis*  
 
Overlap Select Agents 
And Toxins 
Bacillus anthracis* 
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain 
Brucella abortus 
Brucella melitensis 
Brucella suis 
Burkholderia mallei* 
Burkholderia pseudomallei* 
Hendra virus 
Nipah virus 
Rift Valley fever virus 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
virus 
 
USDA Only Select Agents 
And Toxins 
African horse sickness virus  
African swine fever virus  
Avian influenza virus 
Classical swine fever virus 
Foot-and-mouth disease virus* 
Goat pox virus  
Lumpy skin disease virus 
Mycoplasma capricolum 
Mycoplasma mycoides 
Newcastle disease virus 
Peste des petits ruminants virus 
Rinderpest virus* 
Sheep pox virus 
Swine vesicular disease virus 
 
Plant Protection and 
Quarantine Select Agents and 
Toxins 
Peronosclerospora philippinensis  
 (Peronosclerospora sacchari)  
Phoma glycinicola (formerly 
Pyrenochaeta glycines) 
Ralstonia solanacearum 
Rathayibacter toxicus 
Sclerophthora rayssiae 
Synchytrium endobioticum 
Xanthomonas oryzae 
* Tier 1 agents  
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experience with reporting these data, improve the reporting process, and be able to share more details on 
other aspects of the program. FSAP will publish a similar report on an annual basis going forward.  
 
The following report summarizes calendar year 2015 data for FSAP. 
 
Key Program Statistics 
Registered Entities 
BSAT are divided into four categories based on whether the agent causes disease in humans, animals, or 
plants. The four categories of BSAT are: 
• HHS Select Agents and Toxins: BSAT that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public 
health and safety and are regulated by HHS. 
• USDA Select Agents and Toxins: BSAT that have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal 
health or to animal products and are regulated by USDA. 
• USDA Select Agents and Toxins: BSAT that have the potential to pose a severe threat to plant 
health or to plant products and are regulated by USDA. 
• Overlap Select Agents and Toxins: BSAT that have the potential to pose a severe threat to 
public health and safety and to animal health, or to animal products. Overlap BSAT are regulated 
by both USDA and HHS. 
Entities that wish to possess, use, or transfer BSAT must register with either DSAT or AgSAS by 
completing the APHIS/CDC Form 1 (Form 1). An entity that plans to register for HHS-only BSAT must 
submit their Form 1 to DSAT. If it registers for USDA-only BSAT, it must register with AgSAS. If it plans to 
register for overlap BSAT, it may choose with which agency to register. DSAT and AgSAS work together to 
assist each other if one of their regulated entities has BSAT under the other’s authority.  
Form 1 provides: 
• Facility information. 
• A list of BSAT to be possessed, used, or transferred by the entity. 
• A list of individuals who will have access to BSAT. 
• Information about the work to be performed. 
Once the initial Form 1 is received, it is reviewed and a file manager is assigned to the entity. A site 
inspection is then scheduled to verify information submitted on the Form 1 and to review the site-specific 
biosafety and security measures in place. Once the inspection is completed and any issues have been 
addressed, the entity receives a certificate of registration, can acquire BSAT, and begin work.  
FSAP regulates a diverse community of entities ranging from government facilities at the federal, state, and 
local levels, to academic institutions and commercial and other private entities. The work of these entities 
with BSAT includes: clinical diagnostics that are critical to inform patient care decisions, disease 
surveillance and confirmation services, basic science and clinical research, and production of biologics and 
therapeutics such as antibiotics and vaccines.  
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The five entity types are:  
• Academic – A university, college, or other institution of higher learning. Academic institutions can 
be either private (neither owned nor controlled by any government entity) or public (predominantly 
funded through the government). 
• Commercial – A privately owned for-profit company including partnerships and corporations either 
privately held or whose shares are traded on the open market. 
• Federal Government – An entity that is part of an agency of the Federal government. 
• Non-Federal Government – An entity that is part of an agency of a State or Local government 
(excluding academic entities). 
• Private – A privately owned company including partnerships and corporations where no part of the 
income is distributed to its owners, directors, officers, members, or stockholders and whose 
principal purpose is for charitable or benevolent purposes. 
 
Figure 1: The number of entity types by regulatory agency. Percent breakdown in pie chart. 
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At the end of 2015, 291 entities were registered with FSAP, including 251 with DSAT and 40 with AgSAS. 
Figure 1 gives the total number of each entity type, grouped by lead agency (i.e., DSAT or AgSAS). When 
an entity is registered for both HHS-only and USDA-only agents, their registration is managed jointly under 
a lead agency. Fifty-one entities were jointly overseen by AgSAS and DSAT with AgSAS serving as the 
lead agency for 15 entities and DSAT serving as the lead agency for 36 entities (data not shown). The lead 
agency is responsible for coordinating all activities and communications with respect to an entity’s 
registration, including coordination with the non-lead agency for entities with overlap agents. 
New Registrations  
A facility must register with FSAP if it would like to possess, use, or transfer BSAT. In 2015, AgSAS 
approved two new applications from entities requesting to register for permission to possess, use, or 
transfer BSAT. DSAT received none. 
Renewals 
Registration with FSAP requires an entity to renew their registration every three years. This is 
accomplished by submitting an updated Form 1 and completing the renewal inspection process. In 2015, all 
registration renewals were approved: AgSAS approved 12 and DSAT approved 94, for a total of 106 
renewals processed.  
Entity Withdrawals 
When an entity decides that it no longer needs to possess, use, or transfer BSAT, it can request to 
withdraw its registration. As part of this process, the entity must destroy its BSAT or transfer its BSAT 
inventory to another registered entity. An inspection of the entity may be needed. If the entity’s needs 
change, and it wishes to begin BSAT work again, it must reapply. In 2015, 27 entities withdrew their 
registration with FSAP. The one entity that withdrew from AgSAS was a non-federal government entity. The 
26 entities that withdrew from DSAT included four academic, four commercial, three federal government, 
fourteen non-federal government, and one private entity. Table 1 provides information on the entities that 
withdrew. 
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Entity Withdrawals from FSAP 2015 
Agency Entity Type Number of 
Withdrawals 
Reason 
AgSAS Non-federal Government  1 No longer need to store the agent 
 Academic 4 
2 did not provide a reason 
1 possessed only an excluded amount of toxin –registration not required. 
1 has had a change in research direction 
DSAT Commercial 4 
1 validated non-select agents to serve as positive controls in place of select 
agents 
1 the facility shut down 
1 decommissioned the laboratory and the work was transferred to different 
facility 
1 possessed only an excluded amount of toxin-registration not required. and 
wanted to reduce the administrative burden 
 Federal Government 3 
1 did not provide a reason 
1 has not possessed agent in the last 6 years 
1 changed research focus to non-select agents 
 Non-federal Government 14 
5 did not provide a reason 
7 no longer need to register due to only performing diagnostic work  
2 chose not to renew for undisclosed reasons 
 Private 1 No longer possesses the agent 
Table 1: The entities that withdrew from FSAP in 2015 and their reason for withdrawal. 
Tier 1 BSAT 
Tier 1 BSAT are those biological agents and toxins that represent the greatest risk of deliberate misuse 
with the most significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects on the economy, critical 
infrastructure, or public confidence. Thirteen entities possess Tier 1 BSAT and are registered with AgSAS 
as their lead agency, representing 32.5% of all AgSAS-led entities. Two hundred twenty-three entities 
possess Tier 1 BSAT and are registered with DSAT as their lead agency, representing 88.8% of all DSAT-
led entities.  
81% of all FSAP-regulated entities have Tier 1 BSAT. 
2015 Federal Select Agent Program Annual Report   
 
2015 FSAP Annual Report Page 14 of 31   
Top 10 Agents Registered by Entities 
 
 
Registered with DSAT Registered with AgSAS 
1. Francisella tularensis* 1. Avian influenza virus 
2. Yersinia pestis* 2. Newcastle disease virus 
3. Bacillus anthracis* 3. Brucella abortus 
4. Burkholderia pseudomallei* 4. Bacillus anthracis* 
5. Brucella abortus 5. Ralstonia solanacearum 
6. Brucella melitensis 6. Xanthomonas oryzae 
7. Burkholderia mallei* 7. Brucella melitensis 
8. Brucella suis 8. Brucella suis 
9. Botulinum producing species of Clostridium* 9. Burkholderia pseudomallei* 
10. Coxiella burnetii 10. Burkholderia mallei* 
*Indicates a tier 1 select agent  
Laboratory Types 
Each regulated entity has one or more laboratories or secure storage location(s) where BSAT work is 
conducted or stored. Laboratories that work with BSAT range from biosafety level 2 (BSL2) to maximum 
containment at biosafety level 4 (BSL4). At each containment level, there is an equivalent set of biosafety 
guidelines for work with animals designated as animal biosafety level 2 (ABSL2) through maximum 
containment at animal biosafety level 4 (ABSL4). There is also a BSL3Ag containment level which is 
generally used for work with agricultural animals in which the laboratory itself serves as primary 
containment. Primary containment refers to devices that protect the worker, product, and environment from 
exposure to microbiological agents. The most important example of primary containment is a biosafety 
cabinet (BSC). Federal government, academic, and private entities have registered laboratories at all 
biosafety levels. Non-federal government or commercial entities have all biosafety levels except BSL4 and 
ABSL4.  
Security Risk Assessments 
One of the fundamental elements of the SAR is to keep select agents and toxins out of the possession of 
individuals who might intend to misuse them, such as a bioterrorist. FSAP works closely with the FBI’s 
Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) to identify those individuals who are prohibited from 
access to the biological agents and toxins regulated by FSAP based on the restrictions identified in the 
USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Biosafety level 3 laboratories are the most common type of laboratory space approved 
to work with BSAT regulated by FSAP. 
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Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001; Public Law 107-56). A security risk assessment (SRA) is the 
electronic records check performed by the FBI, CJIS to determine whether an entity (including the owner 
and/or controller of an entity) or an individual who wishes to register to possess, use, or transfer BSAT, or 
an individual who has been identified by a registered entity as having a legitimate need to access BSAT, is 
a “restricted person” or meets one of the statutory restrictors which would either prohibit registration/access 
or restrict access, respectively. The results of an SRA assists FSAP in determining that an individual or 
entity may possess, use, or transfer BSAT, or that an individual may be granted access to BSAT. An SRA 
is valid for a period not to exceed three years and can be renewed. Table 2 provides the total number of 
SRAs for individuals that the FBI processed in 2015, including the total number of individuals approved for 
access and not approved for access by entity type. In 2015, the majority of SRAs were performed on 
individuals from academia. 
 
Security Risk Assessment by Entity Type for 2015 
Entity Type Individuals Newly 
Approved in 2015 
Individuals NOT approved 
in 2015 
Federal Government 1,248 6 
Non-federal Government 533 2 
Commercial 571 5 
Private 374 1 
Academic 1,700 2 
Total 4426 16 
Table 2: The total security risk assessments conducted in 2015 by entity 
type and approval status. An individual may have more than one prohibitor. 
A “restricted person” may not be granted access to BSAT. A “restricted person” is a person who: 
• Is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 
• Has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 
• Is a fugitive from justice. 
• Is an unlawful user of any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances 
Act (21 U.S.C. 802). 
• Is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States. 
• Has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or has been committed to any 
mental institution; 
• Is an alien (other than an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence) who 
is a national of a country as to which the 
Secretary of State, pursuant to section 
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 
620A of chapter 1 of part M of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2371), or section 40(d) of chapter 
3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2780(d)), has made a 
determination (that remains in effect) that 
such country has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism. 
Prohibitor Total 
Adjudicated mental defective 1 
Conviction exceeds 1 year 14 
Felony 6 
Misdemeanor 8 
Fugitive from justice 2 
Under indictment 1 
Felony 1 
Misdemeanor 0 
Unlawful user of any controlled substance 1 
Total 19 
Restricted Persons by Prohibitor for 2015 
Table 3: Number of restricted persons by prohibitor type 
for 2015. An individual may have more than one 
prohibitor. 16 individuals are represented above. 
2015 Federal Select Agent Program Annual Report   
 
2015 FSAP Annual Report Page 16 of 31   
• Has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United States under dishonorable conditions. 
• Is a member of, acts for or on behalf of, or operates subject to the direction or control of, a terrorist 
organization as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)). 
In addition, the FBI will notify FSAP when they identify an individual who is reasonably suspected by any 
Federal law enforcement or intelligence agency of the following: 
• Committing a crime set forth in section 2332b (g) (5) of title 18, United States Code. 
• Knowing involvement with an organization that engages in domestic or international terrorism (as 
defined in section 2331 of such title 18) or with any other organization that engages in intentional 
crimes of violence. 
• Being an agent of a foreign power (as defined in section 1801 of title 50, United States Code). 
  
 
 
FSAP must deny access approval to any “restricted person.” Table 3 provides data on the number of 
restricted persons by prohibitor type and shows that “conviction that exceeds 1 year” was the most 
common prohibitor type for 2015. An individual may have more than one prohibitor, which is why the total 
number of restricted persons by prohibitors in Table 2 differs from the number of restricted persons in  
Table 3.  
 
Inspections 
 
Entities regulated by FSAP are subject to announced and unannounced inspections. The type of inspection 
scheduled depends on the event that triggers it, but all inspections focus on the biosafety and security of 
the work with BSAT. The following are the types of inspections conducted by FSAP and their definitions: 
 
• Compliance – Review of entity program for compliance issues, including inspections to investigate 
whistleblower reports. 
• Maximum Containment – Review of entity program, including laboratory spaces and documents, 
for ABSL4 and BSL4 laboratories. 
• New Entity – Review of all laboratory spaces and documents for entity that is submitting a new 
application. 
• New Space – Review of laboratory space and documents for adding new laboratory space to an 
existing registration. 
• Renewals – Review of entire entity program, including all registered spaces and documents, to 
renew existing registration which are typically conducted every three years.  
• Verification – Review of selected portions of the entity program, including assessment of 
responses to previous inspection departures which are conducted within 12 to 18 months of a 
renewal inspection. 
 
Inspections can be led by DSAT or AgSAS depending on the agents the entity is registered to possess, 
use, or transfer. DSAT inspects entities registered for HHS-only agents. Entities registered for both HHS 
and USDA agents are normally inspected jointly by DSAT and AgSAS. When joint inspection is not 
possible, each agency has agreed to recognize the other’s findings. AgSAS inspects entities with USDA-
From inception of FSAP through December 31, 2015, the FBI has conducted 
58,734 SRAs and identified 345 Restricted Persons.  
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only agents. In 2015, AgSAS conducted 33 inspections. DSAT conducted 145 inspections. AgSAS and 
DSAT jointly conducted 38 inspections. In total, FSAP conducted 216 inspections in 2015.  
 
Length of Inspections 
 
Inspection length ranged from one to eight days onsite with an average length of three days. Figure 2 
shows the average length of an FSAP inspection by inspection type. Maximum containment inspections 
were the longest inspections, likely due to the complexity of facilities that achieve the highest containment. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average length of inspection by inspection type.  
 
Inspection Findings and Compliance 
 
The goal of SAR is to ensure a registered entity has the operating conditions to minimize biosafety and 
security risks. FSAP works closely with all regulated entities to assist them with SAR compliance. The 
following is a representative listing of the types of observations made by inspectors during inspections: 
• Omission or clarification needed in biosafety, incident response, or security plans. 
• Inaccurate records for inventory, training, or access to BSAT. 
• Biosafety practices not adequate to contain BSAT. 
• Failure of Responsible Official (RO) to ensure adequate oversight of BSAT activities. 
• Failure to properly implement all regulatory requirements for possession of Tier 1 agents. 
• Failure to wear or use appropriate PPE in BSAT laboratories. 
• Failure to properly secure BSAT materials from unapproved access. 
• Work with BSAT materials outside of registered laboratories. 
• Work with BSAT outside of BSC.  
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When there are significant findings during an entity inspection, FSAP can suspend BSAT work, or suspend 
or revoke an entity’s registration. Additionally, FSAP can offer an entity the opportunity to participate in an 
FSAP Corrective Action Plan (CAP) program to address serious and recurrent findings that do not present 
an imminent risk to public health and safety. The CAP program was formerly known as the Performance 
Improvement Plan (PIP) program.  
 
Corrective Action Plan 
In March 2008, FSAP established the CAP program to assist entities identified as having systemic 
biosafety and security deficiencies in achieving compliance with SAR. To participate, an entity submits a 
detailed plan, including target completion dates and the specifics of how the entity will correct identified 
regulatory deficiencies. An entity’s participation in the CAP program allows FSAP to both provide technical 
assistance as well as monitor an entity’s progress in correcting security or biosafety shortcomings. 
Although often seen as an alternative to the initiation of suspension or revocation proceedings, participation 
in the CAP program is voluntary. If an entity chooses not to go on a CAP, it is expected to successfully 
resolve the corrective action requirements of the normal inspection report process within 30 days. In 2015, 
AgSAS did not have any entities participate in a CAP. Six entities participated in the CAP program with 
DSAT: one private, two commercial, two federal government, and one non-federal government. No further 
action was taken since entities on a CAP in 2015 were successful at meeting milestones established during 
the onset of the CAP. Each entity offered a CAP was found to have one or more of the following types of 
systemic biosafety and security deficiencies:  
• Worked with BSAT in laboratories not listed on the entity’s registration. 
• Failed to follow safe work practices and work in a safe environment with BSAT that could have 
resulted in an occupational exposure to the BSAT. 
• Responsible Official (RO) failed to ensure compliance of the SAR for work with BSAT. 
• Inaccurate inventory records. 
• Failed to secure BSAT properly which made the inventory vulnerable to theft.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In 2015, six entities were placed on CAPs, representing 
2% of all entities. 
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Registration Suspensions  
 
Entities receive suspensions when FSAP has significant concerns for imminent danger to the health and 
safety of humans, animals, or plants because of the entity’s failure to comply with SAR. Their registrations 
remain suspended until such time as the compliance issues are properly addressed. In 2015, three entities 
were suspended (two academic and one federal government) for the following reasons:  
• Failure to properly inactivate BSAT, and subsequently shipping live agent to numerous 
unsuspecting locations throughout the United States and the world. Referred to HHS OIG for 
further investigation.  
• Failure to properly contain BSAT resulting in the unintentional infection of laboratory animals. 
Referred to APHIS IES for further investigation.  
• Failure to maintain compliance with SAR by implementing requirements to secure BSAT, inventory 
accountability, and failing to train staff that led to an imminent threat to worker safety. Referred to 
HHS OIG for further investigation.  
No suspensions were appealed in 2015.  
 
HHS OIG and USDA OIG Hotlines 
 
HHS OIG and USDA OIG maintain a confidential hotline and email reporting system that allows anyone to 
report safety, security, or other concerns associated with BSAT. In addition, AgSAS and DSAT each 
maintain a general email account that receives concerns about BSAT issues. FSAP received three reports 
for potential investigation in 2015: 
• A report from an academic entity about a potential restricted experiment. After investigation, the 
agent was determined to not be BSAT. The issue was referred to National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) under the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid 
Molecules. 
• A report from an academic entity in regard to problems with the intrusion detection system (IDS) 
and whether the entity would be able to respond appropriately to an alarm. DSAT conducted an 
inspection and found that the IDS system was functioning properly. 
• A complaint from a private entity in regards to laboratory conditions. After inspection, this was 
determined not to be a BSAT issue. 
 
Referrals to HHS OIG or APHIS IES 
 
Entities may be referred to HHS OIG or APHIS IES for further investigation and for civil monetary penalties 
for serious violations of the regulations. FSAP referrals to the HHS OIG or the APHIS IES reflect a serious 
departure from SAR.  
• In 2015, there were a total of four entities referred to HHS OIG or APHIS IES.  
o Two referrals were associated with two of the three entities suspended in 2015 (one was 
referred in 2016).  
o Two referrals were associated with the multiple and repeated discovery of BSAT materials 
in unregistered locations.  
 
The 2015 referrals are still under investigation by HHS OIG or APHIS IES. 
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Referrals to FBI 
 
Based on its Memorandum of Understanding with the FBI, FSAP refers any security-related issue identified 
by a registered entity and any report of a loss of a select agent or toxin. The FSAP also provides requested 
information in support of a specific FBI investigation. In 2015, FSAP referred a total of 16 entities to the FBI 
for investigation. 
• 12 entities were referred to the FBI for potential losses of BSAT. After investigation, all were 
determined to be records management errors or were samples mistakenly autoclaved as waste.  
• Three entities were referred to FBI for findings during inspections: two referrals were for inventory 
discrepancies, and one was for a “restricted person” who accessed a registered area. In all three 
incidents, the FBI determined that there was no criminal intent. 
• One referral was as a result of information received by email from an anonymous individual 
alleging that an entity was providing falsified documents to the USG in regards to an entity’s 
personnel suitability program. The FBI conducted interviews and determined there was no criminal 
intent. 
Restricted Experiments 
An individual or entity may not conduct or possess products resulting from restricted experiments unless 
approved by and conducted in accordance with the conditions prescribed by FSAP. SAR defines two types 
of restricted experiments. 
• The first type involves the deliberate transfer of, or selection for, drug-resistance traits to select 
agents that are not known to acquire the trait naturally, if such acquisition could compromise the 
control of disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture.  
• The second type involves the deliberate formation of synthetic or recombinant DNA containing 
genes for the biosynthesis of select toxins lethal for vertebrates at an LD50 < 100 ng/kg body 
weight. Currently, only one select toxin (botulinum neurotoxin) possesses an LD50 < 100 ng/kg.  
 
These experiments are considered restricted experiments due to their potential threat to public health. 
DSAT must review them before they can be conducted.  
 
FSAP has published a Restricted Experiment Guidance Document detailing instructions on how to apply for 
approval or appeal a decision made by FSAP. 
 
The Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee (ISATTAC) and Ag-
ISATTAC are tasked with reviewing the biosafety measures associated with proposed restricted 
experiments. They also provide recommendations to the DSAT Director (for HHS and Overlap BSAT) and 
the AgSAS Director (for Overlap and USDA-only BSAT) on whether an experiment should be approved. 
Restricted experiments involving the deliberate introduction of a drug-resistant trait are reviewed to 
determine if the trait involves a drug used therapeutically for treatment. If the drug resistance trait could 
compromise the control of disease, other considerations are taken into account, (e.g., are there other drugs 
available to treat the select agent infection, whether the drug is used for treatment within or outside of the 
U.S.). Experiments with specific select agent strains that have naturally acquired resistance to drugs used 
to treat the disease are not considered restricted experiments.  
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Both restricted experiment types are assessed to ensure that they can be conducted safely under biosafety 
conditions that meet the biosafety guidelines prescribed in the CDC/National Institutes of Health publication 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 5th edition.  
 
 
Restricted experiment approval decisions are 
the result of careful consideration of the 
unique situation at the entity, the work 
proposed by the principal investigator, 
biosafety factors, and the fact that BSAT 
cannot be transferred to another entity or 
principal investigator planning similar work 
without prior permission. 
Table 4 lists the restricted experiment 
requests submitted in 2015 by entity type, agent, and decision status. In 2015, DSAT received four 
restricted experiment requests for nucleic acids encoding for Botulinum neurotoxin, of which three were 
approved. One was denied because the entity requested blanket approval for such experiments. FSAP is 
unable to give blanket approval without specific details of each experiment in order to ensure safety and 
security. In addition, the FSAP received 19 requests that were deemed not to meet the definition of a 
restricted experiment. 
 
 
 
Exclusions 
 
SAR provides criteria for the exclusion of BSAT (See 42 CFR §§ 73.3 and 73.4, 9 CFR §§ 121.3 and 121.4, 
7 CFR § 331.3). This guidance can be found in the Exclusion Guidance Document published on the FSAP 
website. An entity or individual may request to exclude from SAR an attenuated (weakened) strain of a 
select agent or a select toxin modified to be less potent or toxic. Similar to restricted experiments, ISATTAC 
or Ag-ISATTAC reviews requests for exclusion and provides a recommendation to FSAP. As required by 
SAR, FSAP renders a written decision to the requestor and posts the exclusion on FSAP website so that 
others can benefit from this knowledge in case they also wish to work with the attenuated strain. 
In 2015, there were eight requests for permission to exclude attenuated select agent strains or less 
potent/toxic forms of select toxins all of which were approved, which are detailed in Table 5 below.  
  
Entity Type Select Agent Decision Status 
 Botulinum Neurotoxin Nucleic Acids Approved 
Academic Botulinum Neurotoxin Nucleic Acids Approved 
 Botulinum Neurotoxin Nucleic Acids Denied 
Commercial Botulinum Neurotoxin Nucleic Acids Approved 
Table 4: Summary of restricted experiments by entity type, 
agent, and decision status. 
Restricted experiments require written approval by FSAP before any 
work can begin. 
Request for Approval of Restricted Experiments for 2015 
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Exclusion Requests Received in 2015 
Entity Type Select Agent Decision Status 
Academic 
Brucella melitensis strain ∆norD ∆znu Brucella melitensis-lacZ 
Approved 
Burkholderia mallei strain CHL001 (∆tonB ∆hcp1) 
Commercial 
Anhydrotetrodotoxin 
Recombinant Newcastle disease virus* 
Federal  
Government 
Recombinant Avian influenza virus* 
Recombinant Avian influenza virus* 
Recombinant Avian influenza virus* 
Private Recombinant Avian influenza virus* 
Table 5: Summary of requests for exclusions by entity type, select agent, and approval 
status. *Specific candidate vaccine strains have not been listed for proprietary reasons. 
 
The attenuated strains and modified toxin listed in Table 5 were excluded based on results demonstrating 
they no longer pose a threat to public health and safety, animal health or animal products, and plant health 
or plant products. Recombinant candidate vaccine strains of Newcastle disease virus and avian influenza 
virus have been excluded based on results from in vitro and in vivo studies indicating that these strains do 
not pose a severe threat to animal health or animal products.  
Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin  
Unregistered clinical, diagnostic, or public health laboratories may identify BSAT within a specimen or 
environmental sample. These laboratories do not deliberately work with BSAT but may occasionally 
encounter BSAT in the course of their diagnostic activity. When this occurs, the laboratory is required to 
either register with FSAP in order to keep the sample, transfer the sample to an entity registered to possess 
that BSAT, or destroy the sample.  
 
APHIS/CDC Form 4 - Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin (Form 4) is used to notify FSAP 
of the identification of BSAT that is the result of diagnosis, verification, or proficiency testing, as well as the 
final disposition of the identified BSAT. FSAP has published a Guidance Document for the Completion of 
APHIS/CDC Form 4 on the website. There are three versions of the APHIS/CDC Form 4 depending on the 
reporting circumstance: 
 
• APHIS/CDC Form 4A – Reporting the Identification from a Clinical/Diagnostic Specimen 
• APHIS/CDC Form 4B – Reporting the Identification from a Proficiency Test 
• APHIS/CDC Form 4C – Federal Law Enforcement Reporting Seizure of Select Agent or Toxin 
 
Forms 4A and 4B are used by institutions that need to report the identification of BSAT. Form 4C is used by 
law enforcement to notify FSAP of seized BSAT.  
  
An entity or individual may request to exclude from SAR an attenuated strain 
of a select agent or toxin modified to be less potent. 
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Top 10 BSAT Identified from Unknown Samples Reported to DSAT in 2015 
Agent/Toxin Animal Specimens Environmental Food Sample Human Specimens Total 
Francisella tularensis 89 0 0 130 219 
Botulinum neurotoxins 44 0 10 148* 202 
Botulinum producing 
species of Clostridium 18 2 15 109 144 
Brucella melitensis 0 0 1 88 89 
Yersinia pestis 44 0 0 31 75 
Eastern Equine 
Encephalitis virus 51 16 0 4 71 
Coxiella burnetii 24 0 0 6 30 
Brucella abortus 21 0 0 8 29 
Brucella Suis 8 0 1 16 25 
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei 3 0 0 19 22 
Total 302 18 27 559 906 
Table 6: Top 10 select agents and toxins identified on Form 4A data by isolate type. * Infant Botulism 
cases represent ~80% of botulism cases every year. For more information, please visit 
http://www.cdc.gov/nationalsurveillance/botulism-surveillance.html. 
 
Table 6 summarizes data on the 10 agents most frequently identified in 2015 and submitted to DSAT on a 
Form 4A for HHS or Overlap BSAT. In 2015, unregistered laboratories accounted for 14% of all reports of 
the identification of BSAT via APHIS/CDC Form 4A. In addition to the 4A reports, DSAT only received 17 
4B reports (14 for Abrin, 2 for B. anthracis, 1 for F. tularensis). The reason for the small number of 4B 
reports is likely that the laboratories sponsoring proficiency testing typically use excluded strains of select 
agents which obviates the Form 4B reporting requirement. DSAT only received three 4C reports (one for 
Abrin and two for Ricin) in 2015. 
 
In 2015, AgSAS received 345 APHIS/CDC Form 4s for USDA BSAT. The agents identified from these 
unknown animal specimens included 304 reports of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus, 26 reports of 
Newcastle disease virus, 2 reports of African swine fever virus, and 13 reports of Ralstonia solanacearum 
(plant bacterial agent). Of the 304 reports of identification of HPAI received, 263 were due to a HPAI 
outbreak during the spring and summer of 2015. This outbreak was the largest animal health emergency in 
the country’s history. AgSAS did not receive any form 4B or 4C reports in 2015. 
Transfers of Select Agents or Toxins  
The APHIS/CDC Form 2, Request to Transfer Select Agents and Toxins (Form 2), is used by entities to 
request authorization prior to shipping BSAT. BSAT may be transferred from one entity to another for many 
reasons, including diagnostic testing, scientific or clinical research, and production of therapeutics. FSAP 
has published an APHIS/CDC Form 2 Guidance Document and a FAQ to assist entities in requesting 
permission to transfer BSAT.  
 
In 2015, AgSAS approved 126 transfers. DSAT approved 337 transfers. Unregistered entities initiated 32% 
of all transfers, mostly as a result of identification of BSAT in a diagnostic specimen. 
  
Figure 3 shows the total number of transfers by agent approved by AgSAS in 2015. Figure 4 shows the 
number of transfers by agent approved by DSAT in 2015. The most frequent transfer approved by DSAT 
was for B. anthracis. The most frequent transfer approved by AgSAS was for avian influenza virus. A 
2015 Federal Select Agent Program Annual Report   
 
2015 FSAP Annual Report Page 24 of 31   
transfer request submitted to FSAP may include the transfer of more than one BSAT, which is why the total 
number of transfers by BSAT differs from the total number of Form 2s submitted. 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Total approved transfers by AgSAS in 2015 by select agent. *Tier 1 BSAT. 
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Figure 4: Total approved transfers by DSAT in 2015 by select agent. *Tier 1 BSAT. 
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Figure 5 shows the number of approved transfers by agency and receiving entity type. Federal government 
entities received the most BSAT, likely due to their large size and amount of BSAT work. Transfers from 
non-registered entities are included in this analysis. 
 
  
Figure 5: Total approved transfers by agency and entity type. 
Figure 6 shows the total number of received transfers by approving agency and month in 2015. Spikes in 
transfers were observed in May, June, and July of 2015. 
• In May and June of 2015, there were 45 B. anthracis transfers. During this time, the inadvertent 
shipment of viable B. anthracis was discovered. Entities that were unable to properly destroy the 
agent were instructed to transfer their B. anthracis samples to registered entities for testing or 
destruction, causing a spike of B. anthracis transfers.  
• In July of 2015, 17 Francisella tularensis samples (14 associated with a Form 4), and 9 Yersinia 
pestis samples (4 associated with a Form 4) were transferred. DSAT has noted similar seasonal 
spikes for these agents in past years.  
• In July of 2015, a shipping company that routinely accepted shipments of BSAT stopped handling 
these types of shipments. This likely contributed to the decline in the number of shipments for the 
rest of the year. 
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Figure 6: Transfers of BSAT by approving agency by month. 
 
Table 7 describes the two transfer violations in 2015 that involved entities not registered with FSAP that 
identified BSAT in a diagnostic sample and did not properly initiate the BSAT transfer process. In both 
cases, the samples were received by a registered federal government entity without forewarning or an 
APHIS/CDC Form 2, and immediately notified FSAP. 
 
Transfer Violations in 2015 
Sending Entity Type Receiving Entity Type 
Self-Report 
/Inspection discovery Agent Resolution 
Non-registered 
international entity Federal government Self-report 
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei 
International entity 
counseled 
Non-registered domestic 
entity Federal government Self-report Bacillus anthracis Domestic Entity counseled 
Table 7: Transfer violations in 2015. 
 
Theft, Loss, and Release of Select Agents and Toxins  
 
APHIS/CDC Form 3 - Report of Theft, Loss, or Release (TLR) of Select Agents and Toxins (Form 3), is 
used by entities to report a theft, loss, or release of BSAT. An entity is required by regulation (7 CFR § 
331.19, 9 CFR § 121.19, and 42 CFR § 73.19) to notify AgSAS or DSAT immediately upon discovery of a 
theft (unauthorized removal of BSAT), loss (failure to account for BSAT), or release (occupational exposure 
or release of BSAT outside of primary containment, like a BSC) of BSAT. Clinical or diagnostic laboratories 
and other non-registered entities that possess, use, or transfer BSAT within a specimen presented for 
diagnosis, verification, or proficiency testing must immediately report this information if there has been a 
theft, loss, or release of BSAT. Any incident that results in the activation of a post-exposure medical 
surveillance/prophylaxis protocol is expected to be reported as a release. The most recent version of the 
Form 3 became effective on 12/31/2015. Examples of a release can include:  
• Bites or scratches from infected animals. 
• Accidental needle sticks or other sharps. 
• Spills of BSAT materials outside of a BSC. 
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• Failure or problem with PPE that results in a potential occupational exposure. 
• Work outside of BSC with unknown samples later determined to be BSAT. 
 
As in many work places, accidents and incidents occur in laboratory work. Laboratory staff work hard to 
minimize these events but unfortunately they still occur. Bites and scratches occur through PPE while 
laboratory staff handle infected animals. Needle sticks occur while handling animals or preparing syringes 
and represent some of the most risky laboratory manipulations of BSAT for the worker. Laboratory staff are 
trained to minimize use of glass and to avoid sharp edges but these items still cause injuries. Failure or 
problems with PPE reported to the FSAP included tears in gloves or gowns and failure to wear appropriate 
PPE properly. Laboratory standard operating procedures are in place to ensure safety and security of 
BSAT. Failure to follow standard operating procedures can result in potential releases of BSAT. Work 
outside of containment (e.g. outside of a BSC) with BSAT or an unknown sample that is later identified to 
contain BSAT, is considered a potential release because many standard procedures used on an open 
laboratory bench have the potential to generate infectious aerosols. In many of these circumstances, 
respiratory PPE has not been worn by laboratory staff. The risk in these situations is difficult to quantify, 
and out of an abundance of caution, FSAP considers these incidents as potential exposures. 
In 2015, there were 12 potential losses and 233 potential releases reported to FSAP. 
• 12 reports of losses of BSAT were investigated by the FBI, and all were determined to be records 
management errors or were samples mistakenly autoclaved as waste.  
• Of the 233 potential releases: 
o 199 reports were determined to represent potential occupational exposure to laboratory 
workers.  
 Of the 199, two reports of seroconversions involving three laboratory staff with no 
known incident which were identified by routine annual screening of laboratory 
staff. 
o Two were potential releases of Xanthomonas oryzae. Because this BSAT infects plants 
and is not a danger to humans, these events were not classified as potential exposures but 
as releases outside primary containment (like a BSC).  
o 32 reports did not meet the regulatory criteria for a release. 
 
In response to these 201 potential occupational exposure events (90 from registered entities and 111 from 
unregistered entities), 908 laboratory workers (196 at registered entities, 712 at non-registered entities) 
were provided occupational health services, including medical assessments, diagnostic testing, and 
prophylaxis as necessary. Six hundred seventy-one of the potentially exposed laboratorians worked with 
the unknown diagnostic samples outside of a BSC prior to their identification as BSAT, causing a large 
number of individuals potentially exposed at non-registered entities. Similarly, regulated entities had 25 
individuals potentially exposed to BSAT while working on unknown diagnostic samples outside of a BSC. 
The FSAP considers all laboratory staff that entered the laboratory while these samples were being worked 
on as potentially exposed. No potential releases resulted in transmissions outside of the laboratories, 
illnesses in any of the potentially exposed individuals, or deaths. 
  
FSAP received two reports involving three individuals that seroconverted (e.g., 4-fold rise in antibodies 
associated with infection from an agent) to BSAT they worked with. These events are detailed in the 
following list: 
• Two workers at a federal government entity were exposed to Coxiella burnetii. This was discovered as 
part of the entity’s routine serological testing of laboratory staff. No laboratory incident or event was 
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linked to the seroconversion. Both workers have remained asymptomatic and continue to perform their 
work without restrictions. There was no evidence of transmission to other workers. 
• One worker at an academic entity tested positive for Brucella by serological testing during an annual 
screening process. There was no known laboratory incident or event linked with this seroconversion. 
Occupational health professionals monitored the worker for an extended period of time. The worker 
never demonstrated symptoms and has remained asymptomatic. There was no evidence of 
transmission to other workers.  
 
In 2015, there were no reported thefts of BSAT. While 12 losses of BSAT were reported, the FBI 
investigations determined these were the result of administrative errors and no actual losses occurred. The 
reported losses break down as follows: 
• Three were samples mistakenly autoclaved as waste.  
• Nine were determined to be human error in inventory record keeping. 
Emergency Response 
FSAP reaches out to assist entities with transferring or securing BSAT that may be affected by adverse 
weather events that could affect the safety and security of BSAT. There were 13 adverse weather events in 
2015, and FSAP contacted a total of 121 affected entities. Table 9 summarizes FSAP’s assistance efforts 
during weather emergencies. All affected entities were successfully contacted and did not require 
assistance. There were no releases of BSAT as the result of any weather emergencies in 2015. 
 
Emergency Response Events of 2015 
 
 
 
  
2015 Event # of Entities Contacted 
Tropical Storm Ana 2 
Tropical Depression Hawaii 1 
Tropical Storm Erika 8 
Hurricane Ignacio 1 
Hurricane Danny 1 
Tropical Storm Joaquin/Flooding 2 
January Winter Storm 27 
February Winter Storm 25 
March Winter Storm 15 
Tropical Storm Bill/Flooding 4 
Kentucky Storm 3 
South Carolina Flooding 1 
December Winter Storm 31 
Total 121 
Table 9: Number of entities contacted during 
emergency response. 
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Federal Register Notices, Policy Statements and Guidance 
 
There were five issuances of information in 2015 that fell into three categories: policy, regulatory and 
guidance. More information can be found in Table 10 below.  
 
Federal Register Notices, Policy Statements, and Guidance Issued in 2015 
Table 10: Federal Register Notices, policy statements, and guidance issued by FSAP in 2015. 
 
Outreach  
 
FSAP has an active outreach program designed to provide opportunities for the program to interact with 
members of the regulated community. Outreach initiatives in 2015 included conducting a national webcast 
and exhibiting an informational booth at scientific conferences to provide guidance and promote compliance 
with SAR.  
 
Table 11 summarizes FSAP outreach efforts for 2015. 
 
Outreach Efforts for 2015 
Conference Date 
USDA Agriculture Research Service 3rd International Biosafety and 
Biocontainment Symposium February 2-4, 2015 
American Society for Microbiology (ASM) Biodefense and Emerging 
Diseases Research Meeting February 9-11, 2015 
National Biocontainment Laboratories (NBL)-Regional Biocontainment 
Laboratories (RBL) Network Meeting April 12-14, 2015 
2015 Association of Public Health laboratories (APHL) Annual Meeting 
& Ninth Government Environmental Laboratory Conference May 18-21, 2015 
115TH ASM General Meeting May 30-June 2, 2015 
Joint Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and 
Chemotherapy (ICAAC) and the International Society of 
Chemotherapy (ISC) Meeting 
September 17-21, 2015 
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International 61st 
Annual Seminar and Exhibits September 28 - October 1, 2015 
American Biological Safety Association Annual Conference October 10-14, 2015 
Webcasts Date 
Select Agent webcast addressing questions on forms, referrals, and 
thefts, loss and releases November 19, 2015 
Table 11: A listing of FSAP outreach to the regulated community in 2015. 
Federal Register Notices Policy Guidance 
Federal Register/Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding the biennial review and 
republication of the list of select agents and 
toxins (March)  
Policy statement regarding when APHIS and 
CDC Import Permits are not required for the 
importation or interstate transportation of 
select agents (February).  
Updated guidance on the criteria 
reviewed and considered by the FSAP 
in determining if certain experiments 
meet the definition of a restricted 
experiment (March).   
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking 
comment for a proposal to add certain 
influenza viruses to the list of HHS select 
agents and toxins (July). 
Policy statement regarding inactivated B. 
anthracis and new requirements necessary to 
protect human and animal health (November).  
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